Washington and Tehran signed the Islamabad memorandum on June 22, with one term dominating negotiations: the release of $24 billion in frozen Iranian reserves once a final deal is finalized. President Trump has signaled these assets will move only upon completion of an agreement. Beyond the immediate question of whether to return the funds, policymakers are increasingly examining how those resources could be deployed — and who they would ultimately serve.
An estimated $100 billion in Iranian assets remain immobilized abroad, according to international legal frameworks that recognize the Islamic Republic as a sovereign representative. The debate has intensified over creating mechanisms similar to existing trusts established for Afghanistan and Venezuela — structured funds designed to ring-fence frozen state assets for humanitarian purposes while keeping them out of reach from sanctioned governments.
The United States froze approximately $7 billion in Afghan central bank reserves following the 2021 collapse of the Afghan Republic. Rather than surrendering those funds to the Taliban or using them for creditor claims, Washington established the Fund for the Afghan People, a Swiss-based trust that insulated $3.5 billion for the population while federal courts ruled that central bank assets could not be seized to satisfy judgments against the sanctioned regime.
A comparable mechanism built for Venezuela ring-fenced more than $3 billion from the Maduro regime's control. Supporters argue this operational template is proven and that statutory authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act provides a legal foundation for similar Iranian initiatives.
What the Left Is Saying
Progressives and human rights advocates have largely embraced proposals to redirect frozen Iranian assets toward internet connectivity programs. They argue that empowering ordinary Iranians with uncensored access to information represents a humanitarian imperative that aligns with American values.
The argument centers on the Islamic Republic's systematic use of internet blackouts as a tool of control. During the last major domestic uprising, authorities completely severed domestic internet access for nearly three months — a tactic that prevented external observation of state violence and suppressed documentation of protests before they could gain momentum.
Advocates note that the Office of Foreign Assets Control has already established specific communication authorizations under General License D-2, creating a regulatory framework expressly designed to support providing ordinary Iranians with tools to counter state censorship and surveillance. The provision even authorizes leasing satellite capacity directly into the country, suggesting legal pathways already exist for expanded connectivity programs.
Supporters contend that directing frozen assets toward direct-to-cell technology — which links ordinary phones to satellites without requiring smuggled hardware — would remove the most significant barrier to widespread adoption. They argue this represents a genuine investment in the Iranian people rather than a reward for an authoritarian government that has exported regional instability.
What the Right Is Saying
Conservative critics raise significant concerns about proposals to redirect frozen Iranian assets, even through intermediary mechanisms designed to keep funds out of regime hands. Their objections focus on verification challenges, diversion risks, and broader strategic considerations.
Skeptics argue that creating new funding mechanisms for Iran — regardless of stated humanitarian purposes — introduces opportunities for money laundering, sanctions evasion, or indirect regime access. They note that $100 billion in immobilized assets represents a substantial target for sophisticated financial manipulation by actors with extensive experience navigating international restrictions.
Some analysts question whether internet access programs would achieve their stated goals. They point to Tehran's threats of severe legal penalties, including capital punishment for unauthorized connectivity classified as espionage, arguing that regime enforcement capabilities make broad-based digital liberation unlikely without fundamental political change.
From a foreign policy standpoint, critics contend that the leverage created by frozen assets represents negotiating power that should not be voluntarily surrendered before Iran verifiably dismantles its nuclear program and halts support for regional proxy forces. They argue that redirecting these funds to domestic programs reduces pressure on Tehran at precisely the moment maximum economic pressure could produce meaningful concessions.
What the Numbers Show
The scale of frozen Iranian assets is substantial: approximately $100 billion in Iranian wealth remains immobilized abroad, with $24 billion scheduled for release upon finalization of the Islamabad memorandum agreement. The Pentagon reportedly explored direct-to-cell satellite coverage for Iran at a cost of up to $500 million for initial launch and an estimated $100 million monthly for operations — figures that stalled the effort without dedicated funding.
Precedent structures include the Fund for the Afghan People, which preserved $3.5 billion in Swiss-based trust for humanitarian purposes while successfully denying the sanctioned Taliban regime direct access. A similar Venezuelan mechanism ring-fenced more than $3 billion from Maduro's reach. These precedents demonstrate both the feasibility of such arrangements and their operational complexity.
Iranian internet restrictions have been extensive: authorities severed domestic connectivity for nearly three months during the last major uprising, and Tehran has since criminalized Starlink access while threatening users with severe penalties. Despite these risks, satellite internet usage continues growing in Iran — though cost and access barriers limit widespread adoption among ordinary citizens.
The Bottom Line
The Islamabad memorandum has elevated discussion of Iran's frozen assets from theoretical debate to immediate policy consideration. Proposals to redirect those funds toward internet connectivity programs represent a substantive alternative to either returning resources directly to Tehran or maintaining complete immobilization.
The operational template exists: established precedents in Afghanistan and Venezuela demonstrate that frozen state assets can be structured through independent trusts with unanimous-consent safeguards designed to prevent regime access while preserving funds for humanitarian purposes. Legal authority under existing sanctions regulations appears sufficient to authorize expanded connectivity programs.
Whether such a mechanism gains traction depends on assessments of verification reliability, diversion risk, and whether internet access programs represent sound investment given Tehran's enforcement capabilities. The $500 million launch cost and ongoing operational expenses would require congressional authorization or executive branch allocation decisions that currently remain unresolved.
What happens next: Congress may consider legislation establishing an Iranian People's Connectivity Fund as part of broader Iran policy debates. The administration faces pressure to demonstrate how frozen asset decisions advance American interests while addressing concerns from both humanitarian advocates and strategic skeptics about implementation risks.