Department of Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin said July 17 that foreign adversaries have access to voting machine components and can alter votes in U.S. elections, comments that echoed President Donald Trump's assertions about interference in the 2020 election.
Speaking at a news conference, Mullin stated: "We know for sure that our foreign adversaries, not our allies, foreign adversaries have parts that are vital pieces in our voting machines." He added that adversaries can access "what they consider the key to the back" of the machines and "change voter registration and your vote." The DHS did not provide additional details when asked by PolitiFact.
What the Left Is Saying
Democratic lawmakers and election security advocates have expressed skepticism about Mullin's sweeping claims, noting the lack of documented evidence that foreign adversaries have successfully compromised U.S. voting infrastructure.
Rep. Zoe Lofgren of California, who has served on House committees dealing with election security, has previously emphasized that multiple safeguards exist in American elections. The 2021 assessment from federal intelligence agencies found no proof that foreign actors attempted to manipulate election processes in the 2020 U.S. vote.
Former Arizona elections administrator Tammy Patrick offered a widely cited analogy about machine security: "If you leave the keys in an unlocked car and you're surprised I can drive away in it, that's not a measure of the car's security." Critics argue that Mullin's comments conflates theoretical vulnerabilities with actual demonstrated threats to election integrity.
What the Right Is Saying
Conservative Republicans have largely supported Mullin's characterization of election security risks, arguing that concerns about foreign involvement in U.S. elections warrant serious attention regardless of whether successful breaches have been documented.
President Trump has repeatedly raised concerns about foreign interference in American elections, and Mullin's statements align with that narrative. Supporters argue that acknowledging vulnerabilities serves a protective function, encouraging states and localities to maintain rigorous security protocols around voting equipment.
Senators including Josh Hawley of Missouri have called for continued vigilance regarding election infrastructure. The 2019 Senate Intelligence Committee report on Russian interference in the 2016 election documented how participants at security conferences were able to hack voting machines under experimental conditions, a finding that some Republicans cite as evidence of genuine risk.
What the Numbers Show
The 2024 National Intelligence Council assessment noted that voting machines are typically not connected to the internet or to each other, limiting remote access vectors. The report assessed foreign threats following the November 5, 2024 election.
University of Michigan computer science professor J. Alex Halderman, who has studied electronic voting machine security for decades, acknowledged vulnerabilities but emphasized their limits. "There's no evidence that voting machine vulnerabilities have ever been used to attack a real U.S. election," he told PolitiFact via email. He noted that hardware attacks could theoretically manipulate machines' security controls.
Princeton University professor emeritus Andrew Appel stated that most voting machines today are more secure than those designed in 2000. The Senate Intelligence Committee's 2019 report documented an experiment where participants changed votes, installed software, and performed unauthorized functions, but this required physical access to the machines.
In practice, election officials implement security measures including restricted machine access, locked storage with video surveillance, and chain-of-custody tracking for equipment movement. Most states now use paper ballots that can be hand-verified and recounted, providing an audit trail independent of electronic systems.
The Bottom Line
Mullin's claims about foreign adversaries having access to voting machines touch on a genuine area of expert concern: the technical vulnerabilities that exist in electronic voting infrastructure. However, election security researchers consistently distinguish between theoretical weaknesses and actual demonstrated attacks.
The absence of documented successful breaches contrasts with Mullin's assertion that "there's not a question" about adversary capabilities. Experts broadly agree that multiple layers of defense including paper ballots, post-election audits, and physical security measures make large-scale vote manipulation difficult to execute undetected.
What remains contested is how to communicate these risks without undermining public confidence in electoral outcomes. Election officials from both parties generally advocate for continued investment in security upgrades while emphasizing the resilience of American election infrastructure.