As Republicans prepare for the 2026 midterm elections, a former senior GOP strategist is urging candidates to replicate the political distancing tactics used during the 1990 midterms. The advice comes amid persistent inflation, record fuel prices, and widespread disapproval of the war with Iran. According to the latest Wall Street Journal poll, President Donald Trump’s 37% approval rating is the lowest for any president since 1990. This figure creates a challenging landscape for incumbents and challengers alike.
The analysis, provided by John B. Roberts II, who served as the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) communications director in 1990, suggests that the historical parallel is instructive. In 1990, the GOP faced similar headwinds due to economic recession, the savings-and-loan crisis, and President George H.W. Bush’s broken pledge. Roberts argues that the key to survival lies in separating congressional candidates from the unpopular executive branch.
What the Left Is Saying
Democratic strategists and commentators generally view the 1990 analogy as a validation of the risks of tying local races to national leadership. In 1990, Democrats capitalized on the anti-incumbent mood and the backlash against President Bush’s tax increase, which Roberts notes was a primary driver of the political shift. From a contemporary perspective, the left argues that if Republicans fail to distance themselves from President Trump’s policies on inflation and the war with Iran, they will face similar electoral penalties.
The Democratic narrative emphasizes that the 1990 strategy of internal GOP conflict—described by Roberts as a near Civil War within the Republican Party’s divergent governing coalitions—ultimately weakened the party’s unity in the short term but reshaped the political landscape in the long term. Critics on the left contend that current Republican candidates attempting to mimic this strategy may struggle to maintain base enthusiasm while appealing to moderates, particularly if they criticize the president’s foreign policy or economic management.
What the Right Is Saying
Conservative analysts, including Roberts, argue that the 1990 model offers a viable path to limiting losses in 2026. Roberts states that in 1990, the NRCC successfully urged candidates to oppose President Bush’s tax increase, thereby channeling populist resentment against elites and protecting vulnerable seats. He notes that while the GOP lost eight House races that year, this was one of the lowest midterm losses for a party holding the White House, defying the average postwar loss of 24 to 26 seats.
Roberts advises current candidates to create distance from the White House when approval ratings are low. He suggests that candidates should focus on local pocketbook issues and establish an independent identity rather than allowing outside groups to define them. He warns that allowing oneself to be positioned as a foot-soldier for Trump will only galvanize voters against you. He acknowledges that many of President Trump’s accomplishments remain popular but warns that in competitive districts, making the election a referendum on the president rather than a choice between the candidate and their opponent will lead to defeat.
What the Numbers Show
Historical data from the 1990 midterms indicates that the Republican Party lost eight seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. This result was significantly better than the historical average for the president’s party, which typically loses between 24 and 26 seats in midterm elections. Following the 1990 strategy, the GOP gained nine seats in the 1992 midterms and subsequently took control of the House in 1994, ending a fifty-year Democratic majority.
In the current cycle, polling data cited by the source shows President Trump’s approval rating at 37%, a figure comparable to the lows experienced by President George H.W. Bush in 1990. The NRCC faced 17 open seats and 23 vulnerable incumbents in 1990 after the tax reversal. Today, Republicans face similar pressures from inflation and public disapproval of foreign policy, specifically regarding the war with Iran. The source highlights that in 1990, the anti-tax, anti-incumbent mood was driven by economic factors, a parallel Roberts argues is present in 2026 due to record fuel prices and persistent inflation.
The Bottom Line
The central takeaway from the 1990 analogy is that congressional candidates may need to prioritize their local campaigns over national party branding when presidential approval is low. Roberts argues that the success of the 1990 NRCC strategy lay in allowing candidates to oppose specific executive branch policies, such as the tax increase, to appeal to the anti-incumbent sentiment among voters. For the 2026 elections, this implies that Republican candidates in competitive districts might benefit from emphasizing independence from the White House on economic and foreign policy issues.
However, the strategy requires careful navigation. While distancing can protect incumbents, it risks alienating the base if not balanced with support for popular aspects of the president’s agenda. Roberts concludes that the goal for candidates is to frame the election as a choice between themselves and their Democratic opponents, focusing on local issues like inflation and border security, rather than allowing the race to become a national referendum on the president. The outcome of this approach in 2026 will depend on how effectively candidates can execute this nuanced messaging in a polarized political environment.